We investigated the infl uence of humiliation on inter-group confl ict in three studies of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. We demonstrate that experienced humiliation produces an inertia eff ect; a tendency towards inaction that suppresses rebellious or violent action but which paradoxically also suppresses support for acts of inter-group compromise. In Study 1, Palestinians who felt more humiliated by the Israeli occupation were less likely to support suicide attacks against Israelis. In Study 2, priming Palestinians with a humiliating experience caused fewer expressions of joy when subsequently hearing about suicide attacks. In Study 3, Palestinians who felt more humiliated by peace deals were less likely to support those deals, while Israeli symbolic compromises that decreased feelings of humiliation increased support for the same deals. While the experience of humiliation does not seem to contribute to political violence, it does seem to suppress support for confl ict resolution. Wright, 2006, p. 150) Th e humiliation and subjugation of other groups is a terrible feature of human political life. As the above quote indicates, humiliation is often thought to be a signifi cant cause of inter-group violence. Humiliation has been used to help explain the aggression of Nazi Germany following the Versailles treaty (e.g.,
and the violence of non-state actors, such as suicide bombers (Jurgensmeyer, 2000; Atran, 2003; Stern, 2003; Moghadam, 2006; Newman, 2006; Sen, 2006; Bergen and Lind, 2007) . Th e idea that humiliation leads to reactive violence has strong roots in psychoanalytic theory (Steinberg, 1991) and has substantial anecdotal support (Hassan, 2007) . For example, in interviews that we and others have conducted, members of diff erent militant groups often attribute their own violent acts to personal or collective humiliation experienced at the hands of their oppressors (Atran and Stern, 2005; Fontan, 2006) . Despite the importance of the topic, empirical tests of the role of humiliation in infl uencing violent intractable confl ict are rare (Victoroff , 2005) . Th e research discussed in this paper was intended to fi ll this gap.
Any discussion of humiliation is limited by the paucity of empirical investigation into its qualities. A fi rst step is to examine cross cultural appearances of the word humiliation and attend to their literal meanings. "Humiliation" is derived from the Latin humiliatus (made to lose pride or self-respect) from humilis (low, humble) and from humus (dirt, earth). As an indication of its importance, we have yet to fi nd a language where there is no literal translation of the English word humiliation. Words for humiliation in other languages such as, Chinese, Hindi, Urdu, Arabic, Russian, Polish, German and Hungarian contain these same connotations (relative lowering of social status, pride and self-respect, being lowered to the dirt). Th is literal description of humiliation resonates in speculations regarding the characteristics of humiliation within the psychological literature. Humiliation is thought to belong to the family of self conscious (Tangney and Fischer, 1995) and moral (Margarit, 2002) emotions such as shame and pride. Humiliation is generally considered to be a feeling of being unjustly demeaned, devalued or subjugated by another's actions in a social context (Hartling and Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002) in a manner that evokes ". . . a deep dysphoric feeling of inferiority" (Coleman et al., 2007) . Th e constant in this discussion is that being humiliated is associated with a loss of power in a public context. In this paper we propose that an outcome of this loss of power is an inertia eff ect; a tendency towards inaction that, in contrast to assumptions discussed at the outset of the paper, actually suppresses rebellious or violent action but which also suppresses mutuallybenefi cial compromises to inter-group confl icts.
Leaders of violent insurgent groups from Red Army Brigades to Fatah and the Lehi have long argued that passivism born by humiliation decreases the prospects of popular rebellion (Ginges, 1997) unless the oppressed are "illuminated by violence" (Fanon, 1967) . As many insurgent leaders supposed, power is positively associated with the agency (Keltner et al., 2003) necessary to planned acts of rebellion, violent or otherwise. Positions and perceptions of ijn_00505189, version 1 -22 Jul 2010 being in relatively high power is negatively associated with perspective taking (Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2006) that might inhibit violence and is positively associated with a variety of aggressive behaviors (Keltner et al., 2001; Studd, 1996) . In contrast, positions or perceptions of being in relatively low power is associated with inhibited behaviors (Ellyson and Dovidio, 1985; Moreland and Levine, 1989; Keltner et al., 1998; Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999) .
While it should be noted that insults can cause violent reactions, particularly in so-called honor based societies (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996) , the attempt to insult or humiliate is not equivalent to the psychological experience of being insulted or humiliated. In fact, the extent to which insult leads to violent reactions is moderated by narcissism which is positively associated with power (Campbell et al., 2007) . People who score low on narcissism scales are no more likely to be aggressive in response to insult than to praise; high narcissism seems necessary for insult to lead to aggression (Bushman and Baumeister, 1998) . Because narcissists show high agentic self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2007) and are less likely than others to internalize insults (Campbell et al., 2004) , these results imply that it is those who are least likely to feel humiliated by an insult who are most likely to respond with aggression. In short, there is reason to doubt whether humiliating people and thus degrading their power is likely to cause violent reaction. Rather, it appears likely that humiliation may actually suppress violence. Our primary goal in the research we described here was to evaluate the relationship between humiliation and political violence.
We propose that the inertia eff ect that follows humiliation has a second consequence relevant to understanding inter-group confl ict. Humiliation, ironically, may also suppress support for mutually benefi cial compromise to intergroup confl icts. People will often irrationally resist compromising over values they deem sacred such as "holy" land (Tetlock, 2003; Ginges et al., 2007) . We hypothesized that people experience a request to compromise a "sacred value" as humiliating, an experience that suppresses willingness to act in support for mutually benefi cial peace deals. Th is may lead to intractable confl ict, because compromising over such values is often a key component in peace deals. If humiliation suppresses support for political compromise, it follows that eff orts to decrease humiliation will increase the prospects of support for the same compromise. Previously we have shown that violent opposition to such compromises can be reduced if the other party makes simultaneous symbolic compromises over one of their own sacred values (Ginges et al., 2007; Atran, Axelrod and Davis, 2007) . Here we investigated whether such symbolic compromises might reduce the inertia eff ect of humiliation and in doing so increase popular support for diffi cult but benefi cial political compromise.
Overview of Research
We investigated these predictions in two large-scale surveys of Muslim Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Th e fi rst survey was of a representative sample carried out in December 2005. Th e second survey was of a sample of university students carried out in May 2006. We chose this population for three reasons. First, Palestinian society is an honor based society (PHRMG, 2002) . Some emerging theories of a positive relationship between humiliation and political violence argue that humiliation is most likely to result in aggression in societies strongly concerned with issues of honor (e.g., Coleman et al., 2007) . Th us testing our claim of a negative relationship between humiliation and violence in this population is particularly appropriate. Second, investigating this population allowed us to examine issues directly relevant to the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict, one consistently rated as one of the greatest threats to world peace (Pew Research Center, 2006) . Th ird, humiliation has frequently been used to explain the use of suicide attacks amongst Palestinians (e.g., Stern, 2003 ). Below we describe three studies. Th e fi rst two deal with the relationship between humiliation and political violence. Study 3 then examines the hypothesized relationship between humiliation and confl ict intractability.
Study 1: Humiliation Is Negatively Correlated with Support for Political Violence
In our fi rst study, we investigated whether Palestinian support for suicide attacks against Israelis could be predicted by the degree to which Palestinians experienced humiliation caused by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In November 2005 we surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1264 Muslim Palestinian adults living in the West Bank. Th e survey was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), which conducted face-to-face in the homes of participants. For a description of survey methodology see http://pcpsr.org. Th e refusal rate was < 5%. All materials were piloted to ensure transparency of meaning. Th e measures described in this paper were integrated within a larger survey of political and social attitudes and occurred in the fi rst part of that survey.
Measures
Our predictor variable was experienced humiliation as a consequence of the Israeli occupation. In previous studies we have found that asking this populaijn_00505189, version 1 -22 Jul 2010 tion to rate the extent to which they feel an emotion along a semantic or numeric scale measure produces low variance. A more eff ective measure is to ask participants to nominate out of a list of emotion words the word which best, and the word which second best, describes how they are feeling. In this study we asked participants: "Which of the following feelings/emotions come to mind when thinking about . . ." and we then listed seven potentially humiliating aspects of the Israeli occupation. Participants were asked to indicate their fi rst and second emotional response to each aspect from the following list: sadness, dignity, humiliation, pride, oppression, justice, insult, fear, joy, anger, freedom, revenge, powerful, frustration, powerless. Table 1 lists the events we asked about and shows the percentage of our sample who responded with humiliation in each case. We constructed humiliation scores for each event by assigning a value of "2" if participants chose humiliation fi rst, "1" if humiliation was chosen second, and a score of "0" if humiliation was not chosen. We then created a general humiliation scale by summing scores on individual humiliation scales. Scores on this last scale, "humiliation", ranged from 0 to 10 (mean = 2.517, SD = 1.904). We used three measures of support for suicide attacks against Israeli citizens. In the fi rst measure, participants were asked to nominate their emotional responses to hearing of suicide attacks using the same list of possible emotional responses as above. Th e most common emotional response was "joy" (50% fi rst response, 12% second). Th e other common positive emotional response was "pride" (12% fi rst response, 13% second). For this measure, expression of "joy" was the criterion for a positive emotional response to suicide attacks, although we also examined "pride". In the second measure, participants were asked what, in their opinion was the position of Islam regarding suicide attacks "that target civilians such as the bombing of a bus in an Israeli city?" Responses were coded on a "4" (certainly support) to "1" (certainly oppose) semantic scale (Mean = 2.84, SD = 0.91). In the third measure, participants were asked what, in their opinion, was the position of Islam regarding the suicide bomber who kills "himself with the aim of killing his enemies as some Palestinians do. Does Islam certainly allow (coded "4"), allow (coded "3"), not allow (coded "2"), or certainly not allow (coded "1") such action?" (mean = 3.04, SD = 0.79). Expressions of joy when hearing about suicide bombing attacks were positively related to a belief that Islam supported suicide attacks in general (r Spearman = 0.21, P < 0.001) and allowed the acts of suicide bombers (r Spearman = 0.2, P < 0.001). Pride was more weakly correlated with these same two dependent variables (r Spearman = 0.11, P < 0.001; r Spearman = 0.12, P < 0.001).
Results
(1) Humiliation was negatively related to the expression of "joy" when hearing of a suicide attack. Taking each potentially humiliating event separately, expressions of humiliation when thinking about checkpoints, the number of settlers growing and demolitions was negatively related to expressions of "joy at P < 0.05. An unreliable trend in the same direction was found for the other four events: farmers being unable to reach their land, the wall, loss of jobs, and assassinations. Looking at the overall humiliation score: a logistic regression showed that each increase in the humiliation score reduced the likelihood of a person expressing joy when hearing about suicide bombings by a multiplicative factor of 0.935 (Wald = 4.951, 95% SI for Odds Ratio = 0.882-0.992, P = 0.026). Th is negative eff ect of humiliation on support for suicide bombings is clearly seen when we compare people who scored high on the humiliation scale (defi ned by scoring at least 1 standard deviation above the mean) with others. Compared to other Palestinians, the predicted odds of fi rst expressing "joy" when hearing of suicide attacks was lower by a factor of 0.598 for Palestinians who scored high on humiliation (Wald = 9.279, 95% CI on Odds Ratio = 0.429-0.832, P = 0.002). When controlling for gender, age, refugee status (refugee or not), education level, and whether participants opposition to compromise over the right of return was a "sacred value", participants who expressed "joy" when hearing of suicide attacks still were less likely to score high on the humiliation scale (Wald = 7.208, 95% CI on Odds Ratio = ijn_00505189, version 1 -22 Jul 2010
0.443-0.881, P = 0.007). Humiliation was unrelated to expressions of pride at bombing attacks (all P > 0.4).
(2) Humiliation was also negatively related to the second dependent variable: multiple regression analysis found that Palestinians who scored high on humiliation scale scored lower on the scale measuring the belief that Islam supports the use of suicide attacks (B = −0.183, SE = .08, t = −2.271, P = 0.023) Th is relationship was stable when we included the control variables listed above (P = 0.050).
(3) Humiliation was also negatively related to the third dependent variable (the belief that Islam allowed the actions of the suicide bomber), although this fi nding was not statistically reliable (P = 0.246), possibly due to the lower variance on this item.
Summary
Study 1 found the predicted inertia eff ect. Although the size of the negative eff ect was small to moderate, it ran counter in each case to the notion that humiliation leads to reactive political aggression. Humiliation as a product of salient negative aspects of the Israeli occupation was never positively correlated with support for suicide attacks. Instead it tended to negatively predict support for violence.
Study 2: Experiencing Humiliation Decreases Support for Suicide Attacks
Perhaps the strongest measure of support for an act political violence is the expression of joy when hearing about the act. In the second study, we examined the inertia eff ect of humiliation further using a cognitive priming experiment. Using a between subjects design we manipulated feelings of humiliation caused by the Israeli occupation and examined the eff ect on expressions of joy when hearing about suicide attacks. Th e experiment was embedded in a survey of 720 Palestinian students, half of whom identifi ed with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Th is is a particularly relevant sample as the majority of Palestinian suicide attackers have been student members of Hamas or PIJ. Th is survey was run by PCPSR in May 2006, and comprised face to face individual interviews with participants across 14 campuses in the West Bank and Gaza. Th e study had equal numbers of men and women and the refusal rate was < 5%. We were interested in whether priming participants by reminding them of the most humiliating aspect of the Israeli occupation (standing in line at Israeli checkpoints, as found in Study 1) would infl uence the likelihood of ijn_00505189, version 1 -22 Jul 2010 them reporting feeling "joy" when hearing of bombing attacks. All participants were asked to report their emotional reactions to two of the events measured in Study 1: standing in line at checkpoints and hearing about suicide attacks. Th e wording of the items and the list of possible emotional responses were identical to those used in Study 1. We randomly manipulated the order of items: half of our participants were reminded of checkpoints before being asked about the suicide attacks, while the other half answered the question about suicide attacks fi rst.
We predicted that the eff ect of question order would be moderated by whether participants reported experiencing humiliation when reminded of people standing in line at checkpoints. We expected that for participants who reported humiliation when thinking about checkpoints, the checkpoint-suicide attack order would lead to fewer reports of "joy" when hearing about suicide attacks compared to the suicide attack-checkpoint order. Th at is, reminding participants of a humiliating event would reduce positive emotional responses to suicide attacks. In contrast, we expected that participants who did not report experiencing humiliation when reminded of suicide attacks would show no eff ect of question order or the opposite eff ect.
Results
Th e most common emotional response to standing in line at a checkpoint was humiliation (66%). Th e next most common response was insult (24%) followed by oppression (20%). Th e most common initial response to thinking of suicide attacks was "joy" (41%). Other common responses were "pride" (30%), and "sadness" (8%). Because "joy" was again the most prevalent response and because it showed the strongest relationship to cognitive measures of support for suicide attacks in Study 1, joy was our primary dependent variable, although we ran identical tests on pride.
As expected, the infl uence of question order was moderated by whether or not participants reported feeling humiliated when standing in line at checkpoints: Wald = 4.885, OR = 0.485 (95% CI = 0.255-0.921), P = 0.027. Participants who reported humiliation when thinking about checkpoints were less likely, by a factor of 0.589 (Wald = 6.903, 95% CI for Odds Ratio = 0.407-0.871, P = 0.009) to report feeling "joy" as their fi rst emotional response to hearing about a suicide attack if they had been previously reminded of standing in line at checkpoints. In contrast, participants who did not report experiencing humiliation when standing in line at checkpoints were not infl uenced by question order (P = 0.425). Th e experimental manipulation did not infl uence feelings of "pride" when hearing of suicide attacks (not signifi cant).
ijn_00505189, version 1 -22 Jul 2010

Summary
Reminding participants of an event that was experienced as humiliating reduced reports of joy when hearing about suicide attacks. Th is priming experiment replicates the correlational results in Study 1 where humiliation was negatively related to support for political violence.
Study 3: Humiliation and Support for Political Compromise
In Study 3 we tested two propositions regarding the inertia eff ect of humiliation: fi rst, that humiliation would also decrease support for rational compromises to political confl ict (in Study 3a); and second, that adding instrumental benefi ts to compromise would not reduce the inertia eff ect but rather that symbolic actions by an out-group (such as recognition of wrongdoing and apologies) would decrease feelings of humiliation and thus increase support for political compromise (in Study 3b).
Th ese scenarios were integrated in the survey of Palestinian students described in Study 2. Participants all responded to peace deals in two scenarios (see Ginges et al. (2007) for a full description of each deal) and were randomly assigned, using a between subjects design, to a taboo, taboo+, or symbolic deal. In Scenario 1, the peace deal involved Palestinian recognition of the legitimacy of the Jewish state in return for: (i) their own state in 99% of the West Bank and Gaza (taboo deal), (ii) their own state plus fi nancial compensation (taboo+ deal), or (iii) their own state plus Israeli recognition of the legitimacy of the Palestinian state and an Israeli apology to Palestinians (symbolic deal). In Scenario 2, the peace deal involved Palestinians renouncing sovereignty over East Jerusalem in return for: (i) their own state in the West Bank and Gaza (taboo deal), (ii) their own state plus fi nancial compensation (taboo+ deal), or (iii) their own state plus Israeli symbolically renouncing their sovereignty over the West Bank (symbolic deal).
After hearing the peace deal randomly assigned to them, participants were asked to nominate the, "feelings/emotions that come to mind when thinking about this deal". Th e choices were: humiliation, disgust, sadness, pride, anger, guilt, happiness, satisfaction or neutral. Participants were then given two indirect measures (to avoid posturing) of support and opposition to the peace deal. Our indirect measures were designed to take advantage of the false-consensus eff ect (Marks and Miller, 1987) . Th e fi rst measure asked participants to estimate the percentage of Palestinians who would vote for each deal, the second measure asked participants to estimate the percentage of Palestinians who would support a campaign of suicide bombings (in Scenario 1) or would martyr themselves (in Scenario 2) to oppose the deal.
Results: Study 3a
For both scenarios we regressed support for the peace deals and for violent opposition to those deals respectively on whether participants expressed humiliation in response to the deals while controlling for gender, age, income, education levels, refugee status, area of residence (West Bank or Gaza) expressions of anger or disgust at the peace deal and identifi cation with Hamas or Fatah. In Scenario 1, participants who felt humiliated by the deal reported lower willingness to vote for it (humiliation fi rst versus no humiliation, B = −14.46, SE = 2.17, t = −6.65, P <0.0001; humiliation second versus no humiliation, B = −9.13, SE = 2.6, t = −3.48, P =0.001). Similar results were found for Scenario 2 (humiliation fi rst versus no humiliation, B = −10.28, SE = 2.03, t = −5.332, P <0.0001; humiliation second versus no humiliation, B = −2.825, SE = 2.22, t = −1.28, P = 0.203). Notably, experiences of humiliation were again unrelated to support for violent opposition to the peace deals (all not signifi cant).
Results: Study 3b
Here we investigated (i) whether symbolic gestures may increase positive attitudes towards peace deals and (ii) whether this eff ect would be mediated by fewer expressions of humiliation in response to the Israeli symbolic gesture. In Scenario 2, there was no reliable eff ect of experimental condition on predicted support for the deals. Th us we could only test the predicted mediation role of humiliation in Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, the mean percentage of Palestinians predicted to vote for deals was 38.26 (SD = 24.91). Compared to the taboo condition, added material incentives to compromise in the taboo+ condition neither infl uenced predicted levels of support for the peace deal (P=0.74) nor whether the deal was experienced as humiliating (P=0.54). However, as predicted, symbolic Israeli compromises over Israeli sacred values resulted in increased Palestinian support for peace deals involving painful compromise over Palestinian sacred values, an eff ect that was mediated by a reduction in humiliation caused by the Israeli symbolic compromise (see Figure 1) . Palestinians responding to the peace deal including the Israeli symbolic compromise were less likely, by a factor of 0.41, to nominate humiliation as their fi rst emotional response to the deal (SE = 0.216, Wald = 17.07, P < 0.001) and showed greater support for the peace deal (SE = 2.34, t = 2.26, P = 0.024). When support for the peace deal was simultaneously regressed on experimental condition and humiliation, experimental condition no longer signifi cantly predicted support (SE = 2.33, t = 1.59, p > 0.11), while humiliation negatively predicted support for the peace deal (SE = 2.09, t = −4.36, P<0.0001; Sobel test for mediation = 3.0, P = 0.0027).
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Summary Palestinians who felt humiliated by peace deals involving compromises over Palestinian sacred values showed less support for those deals, although they did not show greater support for violent opposition to those deals. In Scenario 1, a deal including a parallel Israeli compromise over one of their sacred values led to decreased feelings of humiliation which in turn caused increased support for the deal, while added instrumental benefi ts had no positive eff ect on willingness to accept compromise.
Discussion
We investigated the proposed inertia eff ect of humiliation and its infl uence on inter-group confl ict. In studies that either measured or manipulated humiliating experiences of Palestinians in the context of the Israeli occupation, the experience of humiliation did not cause an increased propensity for violent reactions to the Israeli occupation. Instead, it led to apparent inertia: humiliation was typically negatively related to cognitive and emotional support for suicide attacks against Israelis and was never positively related to such support. It is interesting to juxtapose these empirical fi ndings with reports of Palestinian and Islamic militants who frequently attribute their own actions to identity based experiences of humiliation. As is common in other domains where people do a poor job of understanding the cause of their own actions (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977 ), it appears that these self-attributions may be inaccurate. Possibly those involved in violent rebellion witness the frequent humiliation of others who they identify with, but experience this as either an insult or as threatened humiliation without internalizing the experience as humiliating (Khosrokhavar, 2006) . In this way they avoid the inertia eff ect and instead respond with moral outrage and with a propensity for violence (Sageman, 2007) . A related possibility is that there may be some type of "rebound" eff ect of humiliation: those who are humiliated may become less rebellious or violent, but if they are subsequently "empowered" by charismatic leaders or ideologies they might react with greater violence to avenge the insult of their previously humiliated state. Investigations of these possibilities may be a fruitful topic for future empirical research.
Th e inertia eff ect of humiliation also appears to suppress mutually beneficial inter-group compromise. Experiencing peace deals that involved compromise over a sacred value as humiliating decreased willingness to support these deals. Importantly, we found that feelings of humiliation caused by being asked to consider such peace deals were reduced, not by material incentives, but when the out-group made a simultaneous, parallel compromise over one of their own sacred values leading to increased support for the peace deal. Th is fi nding opens up a particularly intriguing and important line of future research focusing on two issues. First, what types of reciprocal symbolic compromises are necessary to reduce the humiliating eff ect of compromising sacred values? In this study we found that a combination of recognition and apology had a signifi cant eff ect. We do not know whether this combination is necessary, or whether one of these aspects (e.g., apology) was suffi cient. Second, we need to know more about the timing of symbolic gestures, whether they need to be simultaneous to be eff ective, or whether unilateral symbolic compromise might decrease the sense of humiliation felt by the other side, thus opening the way to peaceful confl ict resolution.
Humiliation is an important feature of many inter-group confl icts, yet it has been a relatively neglected topic for empirical research. Th is study demonstrates that humiliation produces an inertia eff ect that, at least in the short term, dampens prospects of violent insurgency and also paradoxically reduces support for mutually benefi cial compromises. Our fi ndings demonstrate how a greater understanding of inertia eff ect may reveal methods for facilitating mutually benefi cial compromises to a wide variety of inter-group confl icts. ijn_00505189, version 1 -22 Jul 2010
